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FUNDAMENTALS OF GERMAN MEDICAL LIABILITY LAW IN THE FIELD OF AESTHETIC SURGERY
The German medical liability law makes a distinction between the responsibility for treatment mistakes and responsibility for lack of information. Interventions in aesthetic surgery is, as a rule, a medical practice when the physician is below the standard in force in the respective special field of aesthetic plastic surgery. However, in the case of lack of information liability (tort) is based on bodily injury, according to the jurisdiction of German courts is inherent in any medical intervention in body or health status of the patient. However, bodily injury is not considered unlawful if the patient, after having been duly informed, has given valid consent (informed consent). Informed consent, which the treating party should give evidence at trial, can justify the bodily injury. In the aesthetic operations it is of practical importance, above all, the responsibility for insufficient information on the risks of the respective intervention. If aesthetic surgery, as no medical indication occurs often, the requirements for patient information are particularly stringent. In this sense, the jurisdiction requires a extensive, intense and sometimes “thoughtless” information about imminent risks, in the case of offset to some extent the purely “aesthetic indication” by the qualified patient consent after extensive information (intensely informed consent ). If it is found that the information was insufficient, doctors and hospitals may be liable for damages and ordered to pay compensation for personal injury.
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CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENTS IN CHILE. ECONOMIC AND JURISPRUDENCE ANALYSIS
Construction agreements, and especially those of lump sum, are designed not only to transfer the price risk from the principal to the contractor, which is the party that is in the best position to evaluate and control said risk, but for eliminating or mitigating the problems that arise from the information asymmetry between the contracting parties, including the phenomena known as adverse selection and moral hazard. If these phenomena are effectively controlled, it can be concluded that this type of contract will tend to promote market efficiency, reduce transaction costs and maximize the so-called social surpluses of cooperation. The measure in which these contractual designs ultimately reach their objectives depends on the value that, in reality, the jurisprudence attributes to them. Analyzing the recent jurisprudence of the Chilean high courts of justice, it can be concluded that, in general, judges tend to respect these contractual mechanisms.