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Showing 1-6 matching the phrase private law.

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  • THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN PRIVATE LAW: A GENERAL APPROACH AND A PARTICULARIZATION FROM A CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSPECTIVE

    Juan Luis Goldenberg Serrano

    The principle of proportionality, rooted in ideals of balance and reasonableness, is challenged at the legal level given its equivocal formulation. In public law, it is generally referred to as limiting the State’s discretion and protecting the rights of individuals through a threefold examination of adequacy, necessity, and proportionality in a strict sense. Such an analysis cannot be simply transferred to private law, either because it could end up eroding the logic of private autonomy, or because relations between private individuals cannot be qualified by the extent to which public policies affect fundamental rights. On the contrary, an evaluative weighing of the rights assigned to each party must be carried out, whether this exercise is done ex ante by the legislator, or ex post by the court. Hence, it is proposed that, unless there is an express or implicit redirection to the constitutional meaning of the principle, the balance between the rights of individuals must be observed in the light of criteria that are proper to private law, such as accepted good behavior (boni mores) and good faith. For these purposes, it is also postulated that in consumer law only a particularization of these rules can be observed, but this does not detract from the fact that their basis can be observed in other private law relationships, where there is a weakness of one of the parties, so that the principle of proportionality, based on ideas from the private law sphere, also serves as a corrective element.

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  • Non-discrimination duties in private law

    Felipe Chahuán, Beltrán Flores

    Political commitments against discrimination pose the question to what extent individuals should be bound by them. This dilemma is challenging since the wrong combine individual and collective dimensions which compatibility with private autonomy may emerge in different ways. The place of duties not to discriminate within private law may be clarified if we understand that the meeting between what is individual and collective about them does not occur in their application to particular cases, but in their establishment. Once this point is made clear, this work reflects on the tensions between the commitments against discrimination and private law, proposing alternatives and clearing up doubts that could be relevant in the constituent process recently initiated in Chile.

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  • EXCEPTION CLAUSES IN ARGENTINE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTS

    Milton César Feuillade

    This paper examines the exception clauses in Argentine Private International Law, which were given legislative form in the Civil and Commercial Code in 2015. It identifies the comparative sources on which they draw and traces their origins, since our working hypothesis concerns their current operation and projected use by legal practitioners. Methodologically, the study relies on comparative case law, in light of the scarcity of domestic decisions. The article provides a structured analysis of the proximity principle and the exception clause, addressing their relationship, content, and scope, and proposes a typology. Building on their characteristics, comparative assessment, and the relevant scholarship, it advances proposals for their application. Among statutory models, Swiss law serves as a primary reference, and, in our view, the Belgian Code offers the most precise and modern formulation. The clause’s exceptional character is linked to outcomes that would otherwise be manifestly arbitrary or unsuitable for the case; it should be invoked only when necessary.

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  • THE LOSS OF CHANCE DOCTRINE IN THE COMPARATIVE LAW HORIZON

    Hugo Alejandro Cardenas Villarreal

    The legal theory of loss of opportunity generates genuine fascination. While it has been accepted by several jurisdictions in recent years, it is still being debated in others that had previously accepted it. However, this notion’s popularity contrasts with the lack of clarity regarding its scope of application and legal regime, which has led to somewhat uncontrolled case law. Against this back drop, the present paper seeks to offer a comparative analysis of how the loss of opportunity theory is perceived and implemented in some of the most significant jurisdictions within the common law and civil law traditions. Despite the disparity of approaches observed in the comparative landscape, this paper identifies the rules on which there seems to be agreement, as well as the alternative solution that has been adopted by jurisdictions that have rejected the theory.

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  • THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION AS A LIMIT TO CONTRACTUAL FREEDOM IN COMMON CONTRACT LAW: FORMULATION FROM CHILEAN LAW

    Patricia Verónica López Díaz

    This article aims to examine the principle of non-arbitrary discrimination in Chilean common contract law, based on the regulation that this principle has achieved in European law, examining its justification and its possible alternatives for incorporation into our legal system. To this end, it is proposed to conceive it as a consequence of the constitutionalization of private law; it admits that it is a manifestation of human dignity applicable to every individual and, finally, to outline it as a limit to the freedom of contract, opting for this last alternative based on certain rules contained in Chilean contract law that allow it to be understood as such.

     

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  • RAWLS AND TORT LAW: A CRITIQUE OF RIPSTEIN

    Leandro Martins Zanitelli

    The article challenges Arthur Ripstein’s theses on the place of private law (and tort law in particular) in John Rawls’ theory of justice. According to Ripstein, Rawls’ theory of justice grants private law a certain independence by exempting it from the distributive injunctions of the principles chosen in the original position. This conclusion has two bases, one negative and the other positive. On the negative side of the argument, Ripstein claims that Rawls’ original position does not lend itself to guiding the design of institutions, especially those institutions with a deontological structure such as tort law. On the positive side, Ripstein resorts to the idea of a division of responsibility between citizens and social institutions (an idea that Rawls presents in “Social Unity and Primary Goods”) to demonstrate Rawls’ commitment to a pre-institutional conception of ownership and to the independence of private law that would ensue. The article argues that Ripstein is wrong in neglecting the role of the original position and the principles chosen in that position and exaggerates the consequences for private law of the division of responsibility between citizens and institutions.

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