Search Results
Search Results
-
AGAIN ON ART. 2332 OF THE CC AND THE DIES A QUO OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR TORT ACTIONS
This commentary deals with the judgment of the Supreme Court that returns to the old literal interpretation of art. 2332 of the CC, determining that the statute of limitations of the tort liability action is computed from “the perpetration of the act” and not from the damage, its manifestation or knowledge by the victim. It will be shown that, in order to resolve the case in the same sense, that is, to declare the action time-barred, it was not necessary to resort to the abandoned interpretation, but rather it was sufficient to establish that the damage had occurred at the same time as the causal event, so that the real discussion lay in determining whether it was necessary for the victim to become aware of the wrongful act in order to start the computation of the limitation period.
-
THE BEGINNING OF THE COMPUTATION OF THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN INHERITANCE LAW
The general rules regarding the start of the computation of the term are found in arts. 2514 and 2515 of the Civil Code. From the reading of these two provisions, the beginning of the limitation period is counted from when the obligation becomes enforceable, following an objective criterion. Said principle is not necessarily applicable in the prescription of actions in succession law, since, in said discipline, for a limitation period to begin to run, the opening of the succession is required, which occurs with the actual death or alleged of the deceased, followed by the denunciation of the assignment, as justified by certain and determined actions in the field of inheritance law.
-
SECURITY AND LEGAL CERTAINTY: RELEVANCE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FOUNDATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SOLUTION OF A DIFFICULT CASE
Legal certainty accomplishes (among others) the function of being a general principle of our legal system, assuming a fundamental role in resolving so-called “difficult” cases. Since we start from the premise that difficult cases must be resolved considering the values and principles that support the civil institution involved, all those cases related to the statute of limitations must be interpreted in accordance with this general principle of law –and legal value– which undoubtedly serves it as a base. Faced with the particular and insistent question of whether the interruption of the statute of limitations requires the mere presentation of the claim or the legal notification of the same within the term, it is this principle the one that offers good reasons to opt for the second option.
-
THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT CLAUSE OR INTEGRATION CLAUSE IN THE CHILEAN LAW OF CONTRACTS
This paper deals with the entire agreement clause in the Chilean law of contracts. It argues that the entire agreement clause has the function of promoting legal certainty, by precisely defining the terms and conditions of the contract based on the intention of the parties. The legal effect of the clause is to limit the declarations, promises and binding agreements to what is stated in the text of the signed contractual document, depriving all preliminary and contemporary communications to the signing of the contractual document of legal effect to integrate the terms and conditions of the contract. It further argues that the entire agreement clause has no impact on the criteria for contractual interpretation, on the implications of an implied term, on liability for misrepresentation, and on future variations or modifications of the contract. Lastly, it is argued that the clause is generally valid in the Chilean law of contracts, except in consumer law.
-
GOOD FAITH IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF IMPLIED TERMS IN CONTRACTS
This paper aims to show that the role that the principle of good faith plays in the construction of implied terms in contract law can be elaborated into more precise and concrete rules in statutory law, custom and precedents. This is to be established through a careful analysis of relevant statutory law, contractual usages and judicial decisions. To be sure, these sources are hierarchically ordered such that, facing a contractual gap, a judge must apply first statutory provisions and contractual usages, before relying on his own judicial powers to imply a contractual term. This means, it is contended, that when judges exercise their power to fill contractual gaps, they are also filling gaps in statutory law and, therefore, they are not only constructing a particular contract but contributing to the development of the law of contracts more generally.