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LEGAL PROVISIONS ON INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS: RULES OR MERE ADVICE?
This article addresses an old debate concerning the pragmatic dimension of legal provisions on contractual interpretation. The article uses a case decided in a dissenting manner by the lower courts and the Supreme Court as a common thread. It follows from our analysis that those provisions would not be rules (in a strong sense of bindingness), nor mere advice (in a sense of permissions), but they belong to the category of interpretation standards, that do not impose a result but a burden of justification, whether they are used or not. This form of understanding explains, prima facie, the Supreme Court’s power to modify decisions in cassation on the merits, and urges to deepen on what we understand by breach of law and error.
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ON THE OPP ORTUNITY TO CLAIM THE ABANDONMENT OF THE PROCEDURE: THE CRITERION OF THE THIRD CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT
Classic doctrine and jurisprudence understand that the abandonment of the procedure has no time limit for its filing, as long as an enforceable judgment has not been ruled on. Thus, the general rule on the time limit for the filing of incidents, set out in Article 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not applicable to it. However, a series of rulings handed down by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court have changed this approach. Based on an argumentative evolution, which began with an argument of procedural good faith, this Chamber has considered that the rule of article 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the incident of abandonment of the procedure. The aim of this paper is to show this evolution and to give an account of the problems of interpretation that can arise when considering this rule applicable.
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THE CASSATION APPEAL IN PLENARY SESSION: AN ASSESSMENT AFTER THIRTY YEARS
Article 780 of the code of civil procedure, incorporated into Law No. 19374 of February 18, 1995, which allows the Supreme Court in plenary session to hear cassation appeals in cases of jurisprudential dispersion originating within the Court itself, has been scarcely applied, and its impact on the development of generalized guidelines for the interpretation of laws affecting civil and commercial matters is practically nil. This was anticipated early on by some Chilean legal scholars. What these scholars failed to foresee is that, in the few cases where the Supreme Court in plenary session heard cassation appeals, subsequent lower courts would disregard the doctrines established by the Court without further explanation, thus calling into question not only equality before the law but also the predictability of the interpretation and application of important institutions of Chilean private law. The article offers an explanation of how the aforementioned results were obtained and concludes with a defense of the jurisprudence unification purposes underlying this procedural mechanism.
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ABOUT THE SANCTION FOR UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER LAW
This article examines the sanction applicable to unfair terms in Chilean consumer law, in light of a recent decision of the Supreme Court (Case No. 34713-2023), which classified as unfair an acceleration clause contained in a mortgage loan agreement. The judgment is of particular interest as it expressly resolves the doctrinal debate concerning the nature of the invalidity provided for in Article 16 of Law No. 19,496, holding that it amounts to absolute nullity. The article sets out the facts of the case, systematises the main doctrinal positions on the sanction for unfairness, and reviews the evolution of case law on the matter. Finally, the authors argue that the solution adopted by the Supreme Court is only partially correct, although it is commendable insofar as it is grounded in existing law: it recognises the public policy character of the control of unfair terms and allows for a coherent integration of the Consumer Protection Act with the general regime of nullity, without resorting to de lege ferenda constructions.
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The implications of the integrating function of good faith with respect to the obligation to deliver in the contract of sale: subversion, restriction and warranty
In light of an obiter dictum issued by the Supreme Court regarding the scope of the seller’s obligation to deliver, this work seeks to determine the legal implications of integrating, through the principle of good faith under Article 1546 of the Civil Code, the obligation to transfer ownership in the contract of sale. The central thesis is that such integration, as proposed by the Court, subverts the general rule concerning the scope of the seller’s obligation, restricts the regime of eviction, and transforms the obligation to deliver into one of warranty.