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ABOUT START RUNNING OF LIMITATION ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
The enforceability rule to establish the computation of the extinctive prescription period constitutes the general rule in the law of obligations.
Its traditional interpretation assumes it as a simple matter, the exception of which is the obligation subject to a term or condition precedent. The existence of the credit and the action for its execution or fulfillment constitute the essential trace for its understanding. However, as will be demonstrated in this work, this understanding is not satisfactory, at least in its traditional understanding, to set the time of the prescription of the indemnity action derived from breach of contract. It will be reasoned and concluded that the indemnity action for breach of contract will not apply without the manifestation of the damage.
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THE BEGINNING OF THE COMPUTATION OF THE LIMITATION PERIOD IN INHERITANCE LAW
The general rules regarding the start of the computation of the term are found in arts. 2514 and 2515 of the Civil Code. From the reading of these two provisions, the beginning of the limitation period is counted from when the obligation becomes enforceable, following an objective criterion. Said principle is not necessarily applicable in the prescription of actions in succession law, since, in said discipline, for a limitation period to begin to run, the opening of the succession is required, which occurs with the actual death or alleged of the deceased, followed by the denunciation of the assignment, as justified by certain and determined actions in the field of inheritance law.
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ABOUT THE ARTICULATION BETWEEN THE LEGAL GUARANTEE AND THE VOLUNTARY GUARANTEE IN THE CHILEAN CONSUMER LAW: CONCURRENT TERM AND RESIDUAL TERM
The deficient legislative technique used by the LPDC to regulate the conformity guarantee regimes, has implied the emergence of various interpretative doubts, among which is the eventual extension of the term of the legal guarantee –and its effects– to all temporary effectiveness of a possible voluntary guarantee.
A systematic reading of the LPDC and its liability statutes lead to a negative response, supported on the basis of its internal rationality and the interpretation of the rules of guarantees, in line with those that establish duties of information and publicity.
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ON THE OPP ORTUNITY TO CLAIM THE ABANDONMENT OF THE PROCEDURE: THE CRITERION OF THE THIRD CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT
Classic doctrine and jurisprudence understand that the abandonment of the procedure has no time limit for its filing, as long as an enforceable judgment has not been ruled on. Thus, the general rule on the time limit for the filing of incidents, set out in Article 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not applicable to it. However, a series of rulings handed down by the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court have changed this approach. Based on an argumentative evolution, which began with an argument of procedural good faith, this Chamber has considered that the rule of article 85 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the incident of abandonment of the procedure. The aim of this paper is to show this evolution and to give an account of the problems of interpretation that can arise when considering this rule applicable.
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LIMITATION OF ACTION AND BREACH OF CONTRACT
The French law of extinctive prescription, since 2008, establishes a double limitation system based on a subjective delay, starting with the beneficiary’s knowledge, plus a time limit. The application of this system to the remedies for breach of contract is not an easy task. One could say that the knowledge of a breach –or at least the possibility of such knowledge– fixes the starting point but this cannot be satisfactory from the point the view of the elements of each remedy. The same can be said regarding the maximum time limit.
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AGAIN ON ART. 2332 OF THE CC AND THE DIES A QUO OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR TORT ACTIONS
This commentary deals with the judgment of the Supreme Court that returns to the old literal interpretation of art. 2332 of the CC, determining that the statute of limitations of the tort liability action is computed from “the perpetration of the act” and not from the damage, its manifestation or knowledge by the victim. It will be shown that, in order to resolve the case in the same sense, that is, to declare the action time-barred, it was not necessary to resort to the abandoned interpretation, but rather it was sufficient to establish that the damage had occurred at the same time as the causal event, so that the real discussion lay in determining whether it was necessary for the victim to become aware of the wrongful act in order to start the computation of the limitation period.